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INTRODUCTION 
Volkswagen, one of the most recognized brands around the world, is known for its 
engineering innovation, its iconic cars, as well as its Nazi past. In recent news, the car 
company has also been receiving some media attention at its newest manufacturing 
location in Chattanooga. The plant only opened in 2011, but has since been the center of a 
controversy involving the United Automobile Workers, Volkswagen, and Tennessee 
politicians. The UAW, which has historically worked with automobile workers employed in 
northern states, attempted to unionize the Chattanooga location in February 2014, but lost 
with a narrow margin. While some were pleased with the outcome of the vote, others were 
not, accusing politicians of being too involved in the inner workings of the Chattanooga 
location. Other critics felt that Volkswagen was biased towards the union, by allowing UAW 
lobbyists to campaign directly to the employees. In July 2014 the UAW announced that they 
would form a local, voluntary chapter in hopes of bringing a Workmen’s Council to the 
plant. To grasp this complicated tension, we must first delve into Volkswagen’s history. 
HISTORY OF VOLKSWAGEN IN GERMANY 
The complicated history of Volkswagen actually began as a collaboration between 
Ferdinand Porsche, a celebrated automobile designer, and Adolf Hitler, the fearsome leader 
of Nazi Germany. The pair didn’t meet until 1933, but quickly after began to exchange ideas 
and laid the foundation for a project they felt would revolutionize Germany’s automobile 
industry. Before this could happen, however, they had to separately discover their mutual 
enthusiasm for cars. Porsche began his journey into the automobile world by working for 
Tatra, a Czech car company. Though he had many innovative ideas, such as an early concept 
for a hybrid/electric car, Porsche was truly passionate about creating an affordable family 
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car and sharing his love for the auto-world. However, the company was unable to 
substantially finance Porsche’s budding projects, and he moved to Germany’s Austro-
Daimler (Kiley 37).  Unfortunately for Porsche, WWI broke out shortly after, and the car 
designer found himself creating various army vehicles to supply German troops. Following 
the war, Austro-Daimler returned to making luxury cars for Germany’s wealthy and 
Porsche’s plans to create a car for the working-class was pushed aside once more (Kiley 
37). By 1933, Porsche was working for the Auto Union, a company that resulted in the 
merge of three other business firms (Kiley 38). 
 Adolf Hitler’s interest in the Automobile industry grew while he served his prison 
sentence in 1923. During this time, he read Henry Ford’s Autobiography, My Life and Work 
and was impressed both by Ford’s efficient industrial advances, as well as his infamous 
anti-Semitism (Kiley 38).  Around this point in time, one out of every 4.5 Americans was a 
car owner. In contrast, only one of every 49 German citizens owned a car (Kiley 37).  Hitler 
admired Ford’s work of bringing affordable Model Ts to America’s mass public and began 
to envision a mobile Germany. Hitler believed that by providing German citizens with 
affordable cars, he could increase the national pride and help solidify the Nazi movement. 
Furthermore, Hitler felt that increased mobility also increased the cultural standard of 
Germany and could restore Germany’s economy (König 251).  
Porsche remembers his first meeting with Hitler in 1933, when he and other 
members of the Auto Union approached the Führer for government assistance in order to 
develop new engines and sports cars. It was at this meeting that Porsche and Hitler first 
discovered their mutual interest in building an affordable, mass-produced automobile 
(Kiley 38).  In 1934, Hitler spoke at the Berlin Auto Show and exclaimed the importance of 
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designing a “people’s car” for Germany’s citizens (Kiley 38).  That same year, Hitler and 
Porsche met again, in order to discuss the goals for their new, innovative design. In order to 
gain Hitler’s favor, the Reichsverband der Automobileindustrie (RDA, or car manufacturer’s 
association) decided to fund the project (Kiley 39). Knowing that Hitler held Porsche in 
such high esteem, they signed a contract with Porsche as the head designer in June 1934 
(König 254). 
 Hitler envisioned a small, practical car that could easily accommodate a family of 
four and could obtain up to 40 mpg (Kiley 38). Likewise, Porsche thought that the car had 
to be approximately 1,400 lbs, have 26 horsepower, and reach speeds up to 62mph (Kiley 
38).  Simply put, the car had to compliment Germany’s new Autobahn infrastructure. 
Porsche believed that the production costs of such a vehicle would be approximately $620 
US, but Hitler wanted the cost much lower –$320 US (Kiley 39). According to Konig, Hitler 
publically announced a price of 1000DM (254). Despite his reasonable doubts about the 
price, and likely to avoid conflict with Hitler, Porsche continued to pursue their joint-
project and began designs for a few prototypes. Hitler was pleased in 1934 when he stated, 
“I am happy that due to the abilities of the superb designer Herr Porsche and his staff we 
have succeeded in completing preliminary designs for a German people’s car. It must be 
possible to make the German people a gift of a motor vehicle which will not cost them more 
than they have heretofore been accustomed to paying for a medium priced motorcycle and 
whose gas consumption will be low” (Kiley 39).  
On the surface, it certainly seemed as though Porsche was finally on his way to 
designing an affordable working-class car. However, Porsche continued to have hesitations 
about meeting Hitler’s proposed price. In fact, by 1936 Porsche and his team had spent a 
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total of 1.75 DM and only created 3 failed prototypes (König 254). It wasn’t until the 
director from Adam Opel Company, Wilheim von Opel, insulted Porsche by calling his task 
“impossible”, that Porsche fully reinvested himself into Hitler’s vision (Kiley 40). In 1936, 
he decided to visit America’s Auto-Capital in Detroit (Kiley 39). Porsche was impressed 
with the structure of Ford’s manufacturing plant, as well as the social interactions of the 
site-workers. Without a doubt, the assembly line was vastly different than the auto 
factories in Europe. Porsche knew that he would have to revolutionize how German auto 
plants manufactured if the “people’s car” were to reach Hitler’s goal price.  
By 1937 Porsche and his team still had not reached an operable prototype that was 
only $320 US (Kiley 41). Both Hitler and Porsche were becoming increasingly frustrated 
with the slow progress. This same year, Hitler attended the Berlin Auto show and was 
flabbergasted that the Adam Opel company was promoting a new model “for the little man” 
at approximately $582 US. Wilheim von Opel, the same director that had previously 
insulted Porsche, proudly presented his “Volkswagen” to the Führer, but Hitler was enraged 
(Kiley 42). Kiley suggests that the reason for Hitler’s rage is that he had not been directly 
consulted in von Opel’s project, nor did von Opel design a suitable car for the masses (42). 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the Adam Opel Company was under management 
from General Motors (König 250). Though Hitler admired the U.S. auto industry, surely the 
Fuhrer was not pleased that Americans were besting him. 
 In May 1937, the RDA was no longer capable of running the Volkswagen project and 
Hitler appointed the DAF, or German labor front, in charge (König 255). Shortly after, the 
Nazi party established the Volkswagen Development Company in order to thoroughly 
invest in Hitler’s Volksauto vision. They decided to locate the company in present-day 
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Wolfsburg, though at the time the city was known as KdF-Stadt (Nelson 81). In 1938 Hitler 
laid the cornerstone on the site and officially named the Volkswagen car the KdF-Wagen 
(Nelson 77). To gain interest in the car, the DAF specifically promoted the car through its 
Kraft durch Freude (Strength through Joy) department (König 258). This department was 
specially in charge of organizing free-time activities and vacations for the German public 
(König 258). The Nazis wanted German citizens to see the people’s car as a mode of leisure 
and pleasure.  After the Volkswagen Development Company was established, Porsche 
finally received direct investments from the government, rather than through the RDA.  
To raise money for the KdF-Wagen, the DAF created an investment system for the 
Volkswagen in the fall of 1938. Through this program, Germans could contribute 5 DM on a 
weekly basis for approximately 4.5 years, in order to save up for their own Volkswagen 
(König 257).  Through the combination of consumer investments and government finances, 
over $60.2 million US was used for funding the German people’s car by 1939 (Kiley 42). 
Despite the abundant resources, Porsche felt that the best, most economical way to 
manufacture the car was on Ford-style assembly lines. However, German manufacturing 
plants had yet to adopt this method of building cars and Porsche was convinced that he 
needed to recruit American workers to his factory. In the summer of 1937, he visited the 
U.S. and the Ford factory once more, and managed to recruit 20+ Americans to work in the 
Volkswagen plant (Kiley 45). Many of the workers had previously worked for Ford or 
General Motors (König 257). Additionally, some of these workers were decedents of 
German nationals. Now armed with experienced workers, clear management, stable 
funding, and a factory, Porsche was ready to produce the Volkswagen for the German 
public. 
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However, Porsche’s progress was once again short-lived as Nazi Germany attacked 
Poland in the fall of 1939. The Volkswagen factory was semi-converted into a war 
manufacturing plant producing bombs, parts for airplanes, and a military version of the 
Volkswagen prototype (König 256). In 1941, the production-line was finally operable and 
the factory was producing a variety of military “Kubelwagens”, including Type 82, Type 86, 
and Type 87 models (Kiley 53). Though these were similar in design to the KdF-Wagen 
Type 1, none of these models were intended for civilian use. Military personnel who drove 
Kubelwagens quickly grew to love them for their dependability in harsh conditions, fuel 
efficiency, and wide range of military adaptations. By the end of the war, the Volkswagen 
factory had produced over 50,000 military Kubelwagens (Kiley 55). 
 Because so many young German men were needed for the Nazi front, the majority of 
the factory’s laborers were slaves, who had been captured as prisoners of war or recruited 
from concentration camps (Volkswagenwerk 81). The VW plant engineer, Arthur Schmiele, 
traveled to Auschwitz and hand-selected 300 laborers to bring back to KdF-Stadt in 1944 
(Volkswagenwerk 88). Over 11,000 workers in the factory were foreign slave-laborers 
(Kiley 56). Astonishingly, only 1 of every 8 of the factory’s workers was even German (Kiley 
55). Italians were a large portion of the workers, provided by Mussolini a contract-like 
agreement between himself and Hitler (Kiley 52). The conditions that the forced-laborers 
endured at the factory were atrocious. According to Kiley, workers lived amongst lice-
riddled rodents, disease carrying fleas, cockroaches, and other insects (56). 
 Following the war, Porsche was arrested by French Authorities in 1945 and charged 
as a war criminal (Kiley 57).  Porsche was released in 1947, after his son paid his bail, and 
died in 1951 at the age of 75. By the summer of 1945, the Volkswagen factory was heavily 
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damaged and under the control of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME), a 
branch of the British Military (Kiley 59). Surprisingly, many of the workers stayed at the 
factory and continued building cars by hand. In 1945, they had managed to build over 
1,700 KdF-Wagens. A portion of the factory was missing its roof (Sandbrook 2013) and 
water frequently flooded the factory floor as they worked (Kiley 60). Kiley suggests that the 
laborers continued to build cars and supply them for their British occupiers in exchange for 
food and supplies (61). The factory workers also assisted in repairing some British Military 
vehicles. Despite the workers’ efforts, REME planned to dismantle the manufacturing plant.  
However, Major Ivan Hirst became fascinated with the KdF-Wagen and encouraged 
his superiors to save the factory (Sandbrook 2013). In fact, Hirst was so taken by the design, 
that he sent a KdF-Wagen to Great Britain in hopes that his superiors would take-on the 
permanent management of the factory and produce the cars  (Kiley 60). Hirst also felt it 
necessary that the Germans were given an opportunity to rebuild their livelihoods 
(Sandbrook 2013). Hirst was so passionate about his project that Mike Hocke, his driver, 
recalls the major remarking, “This factory belongs to the German people, and I am here to 
see they get it” (Nelson 102). While initially hesitant, British and American occupying 
forces allowed the Reichsbank in Braunschweig to loan funds to the factory in 1946 (Kiley 
63). This same year, the factory would produce almost 10,000 vehicles under the direction 
of Hirst and rename its town Wolfsburg (Kiley 61). 
 In 1948 Heinz Nordhoff arrived at the factory and was also impressed by its 
resilience. Nordhoff had formerly been on the Board of Directors for the Adam Opel 
Company but was unable to resume his post following the war.  Because of Nordhoff’s 
extensive knowledge in the automobile industry, Hirst and his military superiors appointed 
  Fankhauser, Bianca 9 
the German as the new head manager of the factory. Nordhoff accepted the position and 
began calling his fellow workers  “partners” (Kiley 65).  The same year, Nordhoff met with 
Ford executives in hopes of assimilating into the American car company but was met with 
harsh resistance. One executive, Ernest Breech, famously turned to Henry Ford II and 
stated that he didn’t think Volkswagen was “worth a damn” (Nelson 4).  
Still, Nordhoff believed in the Volkswagen factory and its product. In 1949, 
Volkswagen was the only operating German car manufacturer, and was gaining market 
share across Western Europe (Kiley 68). He encouraged a sense of pride within the factory 
workers by respecting them as genuine stakeholders and compensating them with a higher 
wage than most German jobs available at the time (Kiley 68). The popularity of the car, now 
known as the Beetle, was growing and in 1958, only 10 years after being occupied by 
British forces, the factory produced almost 280, 000 vehicles (Kiley 71). Without a doubt, 
Volkswagen was on its way to becoming the German car giant we are so familiar with today. 
 In the 1950s, the West German government realized that the road to economic 
success required the assistance of outside forces. Therefore in 1955, Germany made a 
treaty with Italy to allow Gastarbeiter (guest workers) into the country in order to boost 
labor production (Martin 35). Shortly after, Germany drafted treaties with other countries 
including Turkey, Spain, Greece, and Yugoslavia (Martin 35). Volkswagen, was amongst 
companies that greatly benefited from this new policy. In 1961, Volkswagen, with the 
assistance of the Vatican, began recruiting Gastarbeiter to work in Wolfsburg (von Oswald 
57). By 1966 that nearly 6,000 workers had arrived (von Oswald 58). The majority of these 
Volkswagen guest workers were Italian (von Oswald 60).  
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HISTORY OF VOLKSWAGEN IN AMERICA 
Despite discouragement from Ford executives, Nordhoff still strived to enter the US 
market. In January 1949, Nordhoff succeeded in importing the first iconic Beetle onto US 
soil (VWGoA “The Volkswagen Beetle”). Today, the Beetle is celebrating its 65th year in the 
USA. In order to expand the exportation process to the USA, Nordhoff sent a former 
colleague, Geoffery Lange, to recruit American distributors. Lange succeeded in finding 
over 10 enthusiastic distributors (Kiley 76). Truly establishing ground in the US was 
another matter. Nordhoff knew that in order to be successful, Volkswagen had to offer 
specialized dealerships and provide on-site repairs by trained Volkswagen professionals. In 
1955, Volkswagen Group of America (VWGoA) was established and became the only 
authorized importer of Volkswagen’s cars (Kiley 77). One year later, Germans from 
Wolfsburg were recruited, much like Porsche’s American recruits two decades earlier, to 
train car mechanics and create proper Volkswagen service shops (Kiley 77). In 1958, Carl 
Hahn was appointed the President of VWGoA (Kiley 84).  
However, the Beetle was met with significant backlash from US reporters when it 
initially arrived. The Beetle was ridiculed for being ugly, out-of-date, and for having 
significant history with the Nazi regime. While the latter point of criticism was certainly 
true, Nordhoff, Hahn, and their fellow executives made great strides in rebranding, as well 
as streamlining the Volkswagen image. In 1959 Nordhoff and Hahn, with the assistance of 
the Doyle Dane Bernbach (DDB) advertisement agency launched a new campaign for 
VWGoA that aimed at being transparent and honest (Kiley 85). Unlike other car ads of the 
time, VW and DDB decided to use actual photographs of the Beetle, not cartoon renditions. 
Additionally, the ads focused on facts about the Beetle, such as how the engine doesn’t 
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require anti-freeze, how the cars run on only 5 pints of oil, how the cars went through 
rigorous inspection processes, and how the Beetle was painted with a rust-inhibiting 
process, not catchy slogans (Nelson 174g). Furthermore, each ad only focused on one idea, 
so that consumers wouldn’t become overwhelmed with information (Kiley 89). Due to a 
combination of repaired US and West-German political relations, honest advertising, and 
Volkswagen’s unique car-shape, the Beetle began spreading into the hearts of Americans.  
United Automobile Workers 
According to the United Auto Workers website, the union was founded on Aug. 26th, 
1935 and elected Francis Dillon as its first president. Since then, the UAW has represented 
over 1 million active and retired employees of Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Mitsubishi, 
Volvo, and other various companies. Over 600 local UAW unions are currently in operation 
throughout the U.S., Canada, and Puerto Rico (UAW “Who we Are”). Though at its peak in 
1979 the UAW represented 1.5 million active members, the current active membership is 
about 380,000 (Pare “UAW’s Chattanooga”). 
As reported by Robert Underwood, an associate professor at Furman University, 
every automotive plant investment that entered the US over the past 25 years has been 
located in Southern of Midwestern states, including Tennessee (466). These states are 
attractive to foreign investors, such as Volkswagen, because of an abundance of affordable 
land, relatively lower utility costs, a decreased cost of living, and a large pool of skilled, 
potential employees, that previously labored in the textile industry (now displaced mainly 
to overseas countries)(Underwood 468). Additionally, southern states have aggressive 
“Right-To-Work” laws, and fewer laborers are members of a union than in the north. 
Because of this, many companies have been attracted to the southern region. Regardless, as 
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the auto industry has expanded into the south, the United Automobile Workers union has 
quickly tried to follow. The union has attempted to unionize the Nissan plant in Smyrna, TN, 
and is currently trying to organize workers at the Mercedes-Benz plant in Vance, AL, as 
well at the Volkswagen plant in Chattanooga, TN.  
COMING TO CHATTANOOGA  
In July 2008, VWGoA announced in a press release that they would build a new 
manufacturing plant in Chattanooga, TN. The former President and CEO of VWGoA, Stefan 
Jacoby stated, “Chattanooga is an excellent fit for the Volkswagen culture, having an 
exceptional quality of life and a long manufacturing tradition” (VWGoA “VWGoA 
announces”). Ron Littlefield, the former Chattanooga Mayor echoed his thoughts, “Both 
[Chattanooga and VW] are serious about environmental sustainability and 21st Century 
manufacturing” (VWGoA “VWGoA announces”). It appeared to be a perfect match. The 
plant opened in 2011 and currently has over 3,200 direct employees and operates with 
over 9,500 indirect employees and suppliers (VWGoA “Chattanooga Facts”). The company 
made an initial investment of $1 billion to open the location, but expects an economic 
impact for TN to be $12 billion (Underwood 469). Furthermore, the plant should contribute 
$566.8 million annually to the state’s economy through tax revenue and income 
(Underwood 469). At the present time, the Chattanooga location is the only VW 
manufacturing plant in the USA, and only one of two VW plants in North America. 
Additionally, Chattanooga is VWGoA’s first manufacturing plant in the United States since 
1988, when it’s previous Pennsylvania location was shutdown (Ramsey).  
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CONFLICT 
In a recent interview with Michael Horn, the President and CEO of Volkswagen 
Group of America, breaks down Volkswagen’s “Strategy 2018” into 4 distinct goals (Vater 
9). They follow: 
  1. To become the world leader in customer satisfaction and quality 
 2. To have long-term return on sales before tax of at least 8 percent to ensure that  
the groups position and ability to act are guaranteed even in difficult market periods 
 3. To be the most attractive employer in the automotive industry by 2018 
 4. To increase unit sales to more than 10 millions vehicles a year by 2018 
The third goal of “Strategy 2018” is particularly important, as Horn states, “To build the 
best vehicles, we need the best team in the sector” (Vater 9). According to the Wall Street 
Journal, Volkswagen is trying to attract “the best team” to Chattanooga by compensating its 
new-hires at approximately $27.00/hour, combining hourly wages and benefits (Ramsey). 
Over a period of 36 months, the employee’s wage is raised up to $38.00/hour, including 
wages and benefits (Ramsey).  The benefits package that VW Chattanooga employees 
receive includes two retirement plans, dental insurance, health insurance, and discounted 
lease rates on VW automobiles (McMorris). While the pay is less than car companies 
located in Detroit, such as General Motors or Ford, the compensation is high considering 
the relatively low cost of living around Chattanooga. 
 Volkswagen also strives to be an attractive employer by creating an inviting 
company culture and taking its employees into consideration. Volkswagen, and the German 
auto industry in general, has a long history of successful works councils. A works council is 
an organized board of blue-collar and white-collar workers that are elected from within the 
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company, by their fellow-workers. On behalf of their peers, the council then attends 
meetings with the company’s management in order to discuss production, labor rules, 
working conditions, safety, and other opinions. Unlike a traditional union, the members of a 
works council are also given access to privy financial information of the company. As 
DePillis, a journalist for the Washington Post notes, works councils in Germany actually 
helped prevent mass lay-offs within their companies during the recession (DePillis “Why 
Volkswagen is helping”). Because they understood the potential consequences of the 
recession, the members on works councils were sympathetic to their company and helped 
organize schedules with reduced hours, rather than firing employees (DePillis “Why 
Volkswagen is helping”). Currently the Volkswagen’s Chattanooga plant is the only VW 
location in the world without any type of formal labor representation (UAW “The Works 
Council”).  
 In an effort to change that, the United Auto Workers union began its Chattanooga 
campaign in March 2013 by collecting signatures from hourly employees. In August, 
representatives of UAW and VW met in Wolfsburg, Germany to further discuss the 
possibility of establishing a works council (Greenhouse). By September 2013, the UAW 
reported that it had received enough card signatures in favor of implementing a union in 
Chattanooga. However, opposition followed shortly after, and an anti-UAW workers group 
turned their own petition of 563 signatures into VW management to demonstrate that the 
UAW supporters were not a clear majority. Furthermore, Tennessee Politicians Bob Corker 
and Bill Haslam frequently voiced their negative opinions of VW unionizing its workers in 
collaboration with the UAW.  
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In early February the UAW announced that a vote would take place later in the 
month. Additionally, the UAW signed a neutrality agreement that stated if the voting was 
unsuccessful, than the UAW had to cease all campaign efforts for one year, nor could they 
request another election for a year’s time (Pare “Claude Ramsey urges”). As a part of this 
neutrality agreement, management at VW was also expected to remain impartial prior to 
the elections (McMorris). On February 14, 2014, UAW held a secret-ballot in order to 
officially organize the employees at the new plant. Though very confident prior to the ballot, 
the UAW lost the vote with 712 workers voting “no” and 626 employees voting “yes” 
(DePillis  “Volkswagen Workers”).  
 In the days following the loss, the UAW appealed to the National Labor Relations 
Board, stating that outside interference, mainly from Tennessee’s politicians, had caused an 
unfair and biased sway in the vote (UAW “UAW appeals”). The appeal stated that these 
politicians and other anti-union organizations threatened to withhold state-incentives (up 
to $300 million) if the location was successfully unionized or if VW did not bring new SUV 
production to the plant (Pare “Claude Ramsey urges”). Bob King, the current president of 
the UAW, remarked:  
It’s an outrage that politically motivated third parties threatened the economic 
future of this facility and the opportunity for workers to create a successful 
operating model that that would grow jobs in Tennessee… We’re committed to 
standing with the Volkswagen workers to ensure that their right to have a fair vote 
without coercion and interference is protected (UAW “UAW appeals). 
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However, the UAW abruptly withdrew their appeal from the NLRB in April 2014 and a 
NLRB judge, Melissa Olivero simply stated that the NLRB would uphold the election votes 
(Pare “Claude Ramsey urges”). 
Since then, the UAW has been trying to reorganize and continue the pursuance of a 
works council more similar to the German model. Only 5 months after this decision, the 
UAW aggressively began their union campaign once more, despite signing the earlier 
neutrality agreement (McMorris). Additionally, Volkswagen executives did not protest at 
the renewed effort. In July, a voluntary chapter of the UAW was founded that did not yet 
require any dues (McMorris). The UAW hoped that enough workers would voluntarily sign 
up for the chapter on their own. By November, the UAW announced once again that they 
had collected enough cards to constitute a majority of the workers at the Chattanooga plant 
(Schelzig “VW plant’s works council”). Also in Mid-November, VW management in 
Chattanooga announced a new policy, known as “Community Organization Engagement,” 
that would recognize any labor representation that received the support of at least 45% of 
eligible employees (Schelzig “VW Policy”). Additionally, this number would have to be 
supported by an external audit (Shepardson). Following this announcement, many anti-
union groups also attempted to gain the support of the plant workers (Shepardson). 
Following the announcement, Tennessee politicians once again urged for a secret ballot to 
take place (Schelzig “VW plant’s works council).  
ARGUMENTS FOR UNIONIZING  
Under section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, also known as the 
Wagner Act, companies may not form their own unions (US Gov. NLRA). Instead, if a 
company wishes to have labor representation, such as a company works council, a third 
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party union must first organize the employees (US Gov. NLRA). This Act has technicality 
has strengthened the UAW’s campaign to organize the Chattanooga plant. In order to 
uphold its own company values and culture of employee representation, Volkswagen has 
taken a relatively positive stance for the UAW, even allowing UAW representatives to speak 
directly with the employees, in hopes that a works council may be established. One 
Chattanooga employee, Chris Brown, is happy that VW is pushing for a works council. He 
stated, “My company is freely offering me voting rights…Why would I turn that down? They 
want my voice (DePillis “Volkswagen workers”). 
Formal labor representations, in the form of works councils, prove to be very 
effective for German companies. As stated previously, works councils can actually help top-
management with decisions concerning recessions and cutting labor costs. Paul C. Weiler, a 
labor law scholar at Harvard University, interviewed management executives from 
companies with works councils in the 1990s (DePillis “Why Volkswagen is helping). Weiler 
reported three main advantages for having employees represented on works councils 
(DePillis “Why Volkswagen is helping”): 
1. Management must think of every decision and it’s effects on the employee 
force in advance. 
2. Because they consist of employee members, works councils are more 
sympathetic to the well-being of the company than a third-party labor union. 
3. Works councils help implement decisions from management in an effective, 
smooth manner. 
Another benefit of works councils compared to traditional trade unions, is that 
works councils are typically not permitted to strike, nor would they be likely to (DePillis 
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“Why Volkswagen is helping”). Because works councils work with management, both 
parties generally would come to an agreement before the conflict escalates to such drastic 
measure as a strike. Organizing a union may also help protect workers from work 
grievances, benefits, and seniority issues (Pare “UAW’s Chattanooga”). Though unions 
traditionally helped employees gain better wages and work hours, these are not necessarily 
“key-issues” any longer.  Rather, job security tends to be a priority for laborers, as a pro-
union Chattanooga resident, Roger Thompson, points out (Pare “UAW’s Chattanooga”).  
Unions can help shield employees from such issues.  
ARGUMENTS AGAINST UNIONIZING 
 Those opposed to unionizing recall Volkswagen’s failed plant in Westmoreland 
County, PA. Volkswagen purchased the location, which had previously been a Chrysler 
manufacturing plant, in 1978. The company inherited the employees, whom were 
organized by the United Automobile Workers, when it began its operation. Within 6 
months, the UAW-represented employees went on strike against Volkswagen (Pare “UAW’s 
Chattanooga”). The plant only managed to operate for 10 years before finally shutting 
down in 1988. Many suggest that the union was a large part of the blame (Pare “UAW’s 
Chattanooga”). 
 Another argument against unionizing is that the Chattanooga location already 
supplies great benefits to its employees. Former Deputy Governor Claude Ramsey, who was 
a key politician in attracting VW to the Chattanooga area, notes that the hourly employees 
at the Chattanooga plant have “good jobs, with good working conditions, good benefits, and 
good pay” (Pare “Claude Ramsey urges”). He then asks, “Why would they choose to change? 
Why pay dues for something you already have? What is the real benefit of a union?” (Pare 
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“Claude Ramsey urges”). In fact, some Volkswagen employees voiced that opinion 
themselves.  
 Others are afraid that bringing the UAW to the Chattanooga plant will detract other 
potential employers from expanding into surrounding areas. Tennessee Politicians, such as 
Governor Bill Haslam and Senator Bob Corker, are amongst those who are fearful that 
unionizing will harm other investments in Tennessee (Greenhouse) (Pare “UAW’s 
Chattanooga”). While the works council is supposed to connect employees with managers, 
some are afraid that unionizing the plant would actually harm their relationships. If 
unionized, then VW employees would no longer have the freedom to approach their 
management team about concerns without the presence of a UAW representative. This is 
more inline with the bargaining power used by trade unions, and not the collaboration 
methods that a works council strives for. 
 Many opponents to unionizing are hesitant to join the UAW because of membership 
dues. Mike Burton, a VW Chattanooga employee for 3 years, explains “a large portion of 
dues goes to the strike fund. A fund that is regularly dipped into for their [UAW’s] operating 
and recruiting expenses. Who would want to be affiliated with leadership like that?” 
(McMorris). 
ANALYSIS 
 It’s important to note that while the Volkswagen Chattanooga workers voted against 
unionizing with the UAW this past February, they have remained are extremely interested 
in forming a works council. Burton stated in his interview, “We want an organization that 
would represent us, but it’s clear they [UAW] were already on board with [VW] 
management” (McMorris). Unfortunately, it certainly seems as though neither the union-
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supporters, nor the union-opponents played fair during the issue, or took the workers’ 
February decision into serious consideration. Volkswagen appeared to provide a very 
biased mouthpiece for the United Auto Workers, allowing them to campaign within the 
building by providing pamphlets, hosting meetings, and approaching workers for 
signatures of support. Furthermore, the German trade union that represents Volkswagen’s 
workers in Germany, IG Metall, has implored the Chattanooga plant to officially recognize 
the UAW and not to make agreements with other unions (Schelzig “VW Policy”). However, 
Volkswagen did not allow similar opportunities for other unions to speak to the 
Chattanooga force, nor did they permit anti-union organizations to campaign within the 
building, even though VW employees seeking alternate routes to a works council had 
directly formed many of these groups.  
 It is especially troublesome that VW did not reprimand the United Auto Workers for 
clearly breaking the neutrality agreement and resuming its campaign mere months after 
the workers had participated in their secret ballot. In fact, Volkswagen also broke the 
neutrality agreement by favoring the UAW over other campaigns. The obvious favoritism 
suggests that VW plans to override the wishes of its workers. Volkswagen is therefore 
going against the very idea of listening to its employees through a works council and is 
instead playing the role of an overbearing, controlling parent.  
 The United Auto Workers accused Senator Corker and Governor Haslam of gross 
misconduct, interference, and intimidation to sway the ballot in February. Prior to the vote, 
the UAW was confident that they possessed the support of over 50% of the plant 
employees, based on collected cards and signatures. However, when the results were 
counted 53% of the employees voted against organizing with the UAW. If anything, this can 
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also speak towards the power of intimidation. The UAW collected cards throughout their 
campaign on a personal, not anonymous, basis. The workers easily may have felt pressured 
into signing their support. This does not suggest that the employees were fully informed on 
the matter yet, but rather felt like they had to sign at that moment. When the time to vote 
arrived, these employees may have cast a new vote under the stress-free procedures of a 
secret ballot.  
 The anti-union side also engaged in some questionable practices. Senator Corker’s 
and Governor Haslam’s opinions, as well as financial purses, definitely may have affected 
the outcome. Considering that the South has a long history of uncertain job security, the 
prospect of adding an SUV production line to the plant, as well as establishing an additional 
2,000 jobs, would be extremely appealing to the Volkswagen employees. This would most 
certainly establish job security for those already at the plant. Furthermore, the $300 million 
incentive may have changed the minds of a few pro-UAW sympathizers. As was previously 
stated, this would help expand the plant and create more job security. While the politicians 
should not have been engaging in the affairs of a private business, their vocal opinions were 
probably less intimidating than the constant presence of the United Auto Workers 
representatives in the Volkswagen plant. In an interview with a Chattanooga plant 
employee, Mike Burton, he reported that VW management provided office space for the 
UAW during their campaign, and that the UAW were free to network with employees 
during lunch breaks (McMorris). 
 In response to the UAW’s continued campaign, some VW employees decided to 
found their own “grass-roots” union. The American Council of Employees, also known as 
ACE, was founded in September 2014 by Chattanooga workers to represent themselves 
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(DePillis “The strange case”). The group’s current president, Sean Moss, insists that 
workers must have a right to be heard, but doesn’t think that the UAW is the appropriate 
choice for Chattanooga. He describes how he perceives the UAW, “I saw mismanagement, I 
saw malfeasance, I saw cronyism, I saw nepotism. Just looking at their membership 
numbers, the way they’ve declined since 2002. Job security? Well, you can’t give me that. 
And when I look at our wages compared with the big three, we’re doing better, so you can’t 
give me a raise” (DePillis “The strange case”). 
CONCLUSION 
 On December 8th, 2014 Volkswagen announced that after an external audit was 
conducted, the United Auto Workers had successfully gained at least 45% of the laborers’ 
support in Chattanooga (Shepardson). VW gave the UAW expanded rights within the 
location. With these new access rights, the Chattanooga chapter will attend bi-weekly 
meetings with the HR department within Chattanooga. The UAW will also attend a meeting 
with the VW Chattanooga executive committee once a month (Shepardson). Though the 
UAW has “won” in many ways, this still doesn’t permit them sole representation of the 
Chattanooga members, nor are they able to bargain wage and other worker’s rights with 
the company (Shepardson). 
 Despite Volkswagen’s most recent announcement, the method of how the 
Chattanooga employees are represented remains largely uncertain. Neither the UAW nor 
Volkswagen released the official support percentage of Chattanooga employees towards 
the union. Assuming the United Auto Workers received 45-55% support of the eligible 
employees, other unions or anti-union groups can continue to campaign to be a 
representative of the employees as well. Based on their “Community Organization 
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Engagement” from November, Volkswagen Chattanooga will give any group that receives 
45% support monthly access to their executive meetings. 
 There could also be backlash about VW favoring the UAW over other labor groups. 
Already, the American Council of Employees plans to take legal action against the UAW 
(Pare “ACE says”). They organization feels that it didn’t receive adequate consideration 
from Volkswagen management (Pare “ACE says”). Furthermore, ACE accuses the UAW of 
including outdated signatures in their support-statistics (Pare “ACE says”). Some justifiably 
might feel that Volkswagen’s November announcement and the UAW’s November 
declaration of their majority of the workers’ support was not sheer coincidence.  
 A works council, in which every employee is represented and is actually valued by 
management, is a truly progressive notion within the corporate culture of the United States. 
It would ensure that employees could directly speak to their employers about concerns, 
and employers could reach out for feedback and input during critical times. It stands in 
huge contrast to the traditional trade union, where employees can only negotiate with 
employers if outside representation present, and employers dread the constant demands. 
Just as the Heinz Nordhoff saw the value of calling his employees “partners,” Volkswagen 
sees the value of listening to their employees and working with them to create a better and 
happier work environment. While VW’s intentions to create a works council may be pure, 
some employees are wary of the methods that VW and the UAW have taken to do so.  
Unfortunately, this may weaken the very trust that VW aims to build between themselves 
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